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KIRK LUDWIG 
The word 'concept' is used in a variety of ways, as Frege remarked over 
a century ago; 'its sense', he said, 'is sometimes psychological, sometimes 
logical, and sometimes perhaps a confused mixture of both' (Frege, 1960a, 
p.42). Despite the ambiguity of the word, it has long played a central 
role in philosophical discussion, and the questions of what concepts are 
and how we are to undertand talk of them are of central importance to 
that self-understanding which is one of the peculiar aims of philosophy. 
And to the extent to which it is correct to conceive of philosophy as 
mapping out the conceptual structure of the world, and to see that structure 
as the structure within which empirical variation of theory can take place, 
these questions are of fundamental importance to all scientific and rational 
inquiry. 
Despite the centrality of the concept (or concepts) of a concept in philo- 
sophy, it tends to be used in the course of philosophical inquiry rather 
more often than it is taken as its subject. This makes Christopher Peac- 
ocke's contribution to its discussion in A Study of Concepts a welcome one. 
As the title suggests, the book makes no pretence of being an exhaustive 
examination of the concept of a concept, nor of being restricted in scope 
to the concept of a concept. The book does not introduce and argue for a 
central thesis, but rather introduces a research program, and cames out 
a number of investigations under its guidance, which the author admits 
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need further filling in and elaboration. It is nonetheless an ambitious 
book. For it seeks to set out a general framework for giving theories of 
particular concepts, and to derive important conclusions from that general 
framework about the nature of thought, as well as to apply it by way of 
illustration, and elaboration, to a variety of important concepts and kinds 
of concept, some which are used in the explication of the theory itself. 
This workman-like book is divided into eight chapters, the first of 
which, on the individuation of concepts, is the most important, since it 
lays out Peacocke’s framework for giving analyses of particular concepts 
in terms of their possession conditions (see also Peacocke, 1989a, 1989b). 
The second chapter, on system and structure, traces out some consequences 
of the framework developed in the first chapter. Peacocke argues that 
various independently plausible principles governing thought contents 
follow from the conditions on accounts of concepts he lays down in the first 
chapter. In particular, Peacocke argues that the following two principles can 
be derived from his general framework for giving accounts of concepts: 
(i) Evans’s Generality Constraint, which holds that, for example, if one 
can think Fa, and possesses the singular concept b, which is in the range 
of objects which can be F, one can think Fb; and (ii) what Peacocke calls 
the Productivity Principle, which holds that if one possesses the first level 
concept F, and one acquires the singular concept m, one can think thoughts 
containing Fm as a constituent. In the third chapter, Peacocke develops a 
general account of the possession conditions for concepts involved in 
perceptual contents in terms of the notion, employed in previous work, 
of a scenario, a set of ways of filling in the space around a perceiver 
compatible with the content of his perceptual representation of it (see also 
Peacocke, 1992). The fourth chapter deals with the metaphysics of concepts, 
and urges in particular that the status of concepts as abstract objects 
presents no obstacle to their being employed in a description of the 
empirical world (see also Peacocke, 1991a). The fifth chapter is likewise 
concerned with a possible objection to the framework for giving accounts 
of concepts developed earlier, namely, that the normativity of concepts 
and contents is incompatible with a naturalistic world view (Peacocke, 
1990a). In the sixth chapter, the framework is applied to the concept of 
belief, which plays a central role in the account in chapter one. The 
seventh chapter urges that a philosophical account of concepts is relevant 
to psychological explanation, and, in particular, that for ‘any particular 
concept, the task for the psychologist is not fully formulated until the 
philosopher has supplied an adequate possession condition for it’ (p. 190; 
unless otherwise noted, all parenthetical page citations are to A Study of 
Concepts). (See also Peacocke, 1990b.) The final chapter develops with 
respect to some specific examples a treatment of the illusion of content, 
that is, it illustrates how to explain what occurs when one supposes one 
has a thought with a content when one does not, as, for example, in the 
case of the hypothesis of absolute space (see also Peacocke, 1988). 
Many of the themes and arguments of the book (as indicated) have 
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appeared in Peacocke’s previous work in the form of articles, but the 
material has been reworked for the book for presentation as a unified 
project. The book is densely argued, and it is beyond the scope of this 
review to treat every topic covered, or any of the topics fully. In the 
following, I will consider the basic framework, its application to the sys- 
tematicity of thought, the response to potential objections in the chapters 
on the metaphysics of concepts and naturalism, and the treatment of the 
concept of belief. 
1. Individuating Concepts 
Near the beginning of the book, Peacocke tells his reader that he ’will be 
using the word ”concept” stipulatively as follows’ (p. 2): 
Distinctness of Concepts Concepts C and D are distinct if and 
only if there are two complete propositional contents that differ 
at most in that one contains C substituted in one or more places 
for D, and one of which is potentially informative while the other 
is not. 
This is perhaps a slightly misleading way of introducing his subject, since 
it is clear that Peacocke does not mean to be introducing an arbitrary use 
for the word, but rather to be identifying or introducing a use that tracks 
one of the principal roles for which concepts have been traditionally 
employed in philosophy, namely, as the shared constituents of the contents 
of different thoughts. In a book sometimes more difficult to read than its 
subject matter justifies, an account at the outset of where the author thinks 
his use of ‘concept’ fits with respect to the tradition’s use of that word 
would have been welcome. The antecedent that Peacocke has in mind 
emerges by page 15, when he identifies the above principle as Frege’s 
‘intuitive identity condition for concepts’. This too, however, is a bit 
misleading, since Frege’s use of the word ’concept’ (or rather of ‘Begriff’, 
which is standardly translated as ‘concept’ in Frege’s writings) is not the 
same as Peacocke’s, as Peacocke himself acknowledges (p. 2). Peacocke 
treats the Fregean sense of a word as the concept expressed by that word. 
Frege, of course, distinguished between sense (Sinn) and concept (Begriff), 
which he associated with incomplete expressions. In Frege’s use, a concept 
is the referent of an incomplete expression whose completion yields a 
sentence, such as ‘x is a horse’, which Frege treated as ‘a function whose 
value is always a truth-value’ (Frege, 1960b, p. 155). This is to use the 
word in what Frege called a purely logical sense. The principle Peacocke 
gives above is derived, of course, not from Frege’s discussion of Begriff 
but of Sinn. The sense of a sentence is a thought, what we grasp when 
we understand the sentence, and, hence, has a psychological element not 
present in the Fregean use of the word ’concept’. 
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It is clearly crucial to understanding Peacocke’s use of ‘concept’ to 
understand the notion of the potential informativeness of a propositional 
content. Peacocke treats propositional contents as structured items whose 
constituents are concepts. Contents determine the truth conditions for 
‘indicative’ thoughts whose contents they are. We can think of the specifi- 
cation of the truth conditions for a thought as being in the form of a 
biconditional 
A’s thought T(C)  is true at t iff p 
where ’C’ represents the content of the thought and ‘p’ is replaced by a 
sentence that expresses that content. Suppose now that C(A,B) is a content 
whose structure is indicated by the arrangement of the expressions within 
the parentheses of the expression denoting it, and that ‘A‘ and ’B’ denote 
concepts. C(D,B) would then be said to be a content derived from C(A,B) 
by substituting D for A, i.e. C(D,B) and C(A,B) have the same structure, 
but differ in what concept occupies what we can call the first location 
within that structure. What is it for C(A,B) to be potentially informative, 
while C(D,B) is not? Peacocke never makes precise this important notion 
in his account, so what I say about this is speculative. It is natural, 
however, to try to spell it out in the following way. Suppose that it is 
necessary that C(A,B) is recognized to be true by anyone who entertains 
it. Then C(A,B) will be said not to be potentially informative. Then a 
content of the form C(. . .,. . .) will be potentially informative just in case 
it is not necessary that it be recognized to be true by anyone who entertains 
it. If C(A,B) is recognized to be true by anyone who entertains it while 
C(D,B) is not, then A is distinct from D; and if A is distinct from D, then 
there are two contents C (. . . A . .  .) and C ( .  . .D.. .) otherwise alike except 
that A occurs in a location in one where D occurs in the other such that 
one is recognized to be true by anyone who entertains it while the other 
is not. 
This parallels what a Fregean would say about how to individuate the 
senses of linguistic expressions. Two expressions a and f3 differ in sense 
just in case there are two sentences in which a and f3 are used, S ( a )  and 
S(#3), such that one can be obtained from the other by substituting a for 
f3, or vice versa, and S(a) is potentially informative while S(f3) is not, or 
vice versa, where a sentence is potentially informative if it is potentially 
capable of extending our knowledge. A sentence would not be potentially 
capable of extending our knowledge if, on grasping its sense, we could 
not fail to realise that it was true. There is a difficulty that arises in the 
case of sentences, however, which is not present in the case of contents. 
This is that a sentence may be informative, and indeed informative about 
the world, in virtue of features of it which do not have to do with its 
sense. For example, in the case of identity statements, ‘a = a’ and ’a = b’ 
may differ in potential informativeness while ‘a’ and ’b’ do not differ in 
sense because they have no sense but only a referent. They may differ in 
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informativeness in virtue of our associating with the signs themselves 
different sorts of information which are not part of the conventional use 
of the signs. Since in the case of contents there is no distinction correspond- 
ing to that between syntax and semantics, there can be no corresponding 
difficulty. 
It is an important feature of this approach, at least as I have spelled it 
out, that concepts are individuated ultimately in terms of a thinker’s 
epistemic relations to his attitude contents. Differences between concepts 
make a difference to the potential informativeness of contents of certain 
forms, and so make a difference to their truth conditions. 
Concepts are the constituents of our thoughts, and we express our 
thoughts in sentences whose words on the occasions of their use express 
senses which are the concepts that figure in the thought expressed using 
them. Thus, the concepts that Peacocke wishes to study are the sort of 
thing that can be the sense of a word, and Peacocke apparently takes the 
semantics of sentences in natural languages to give a straightforward guide 
to what concepts are contained in thoughts that we express using them. 
This is already to be committed to a certain, to some degree tendentious, 
account of the nature of thought, namely, that, by and large, the structure 
of thoughts mirrors the semantic structure of sentences. Thus, we find 
Peacocke endorsing different kinds of concepts for different grammatical 
categories of words, and often calling the classes of concepts by the terms 
that apply to the corresponding grammatical category, e.g. ’singular’, 
’demonstrative’, and ’predicative’ (p. 2). Concepts, being identified with 
possible senses of words, are distinguished from the level of reference, 
and so from the referents of singular terms, the extensions of predicates, 
and the properties and relations that predicates ‘pick out’. 
The most fundamental principle of Peacocke’s treatment of concepts, 
apart from his identification of them with senses, individuated as above, 
is what he calls the ’Principle of Dependence’ (p. 5):  
Principle of Dependence There can be nothing more to the nat- 
ure of a concept than is determined by a correct account of the 
capacity of a thinker who has mastered the concept to have prop- 
ositional attitudes to content containing that concept (a correct 
account of ‘grasping the concept’). 
That is to say, since we introduce the word ‘concept’ to cover the constitu- 
ents of propositional contents, we should suppose that an account of 
concepts will be given in terms of what it is to be able to have propositional 
contents invohing that concept, and that will be an account of the pos- 
session conditions for the concept, what it is to ‘grasp‘ or understand 
that concept. This is an instance of a venerable tradition which seeks to 
understand talk of concepts ultimately in terms of talk of the capacities 
of thinkers. The fundamental expression for the purposes of analysis is 
not ‘the concept F‘ but instead ’x possesses the concept F’. 
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basis of the Principle of Dependence is as follows (p. 6): 
The form for all accounts of concepts that Peacocke introduces on the 
Simple Formulation 
which a thinker must meet conditions d(C) .  
Concept F is that unique concept C to possess 
Here ‘C’ is a variable ranging over concepts and ‘d’ a schematic letter. 
Reformulating this will help to make clearer its structure. We are here 
giving a necessary and sufficient condition for a concept to be identical 
with Concept F ,  by means of a description of it in terms of conditions 
any thinker must meet to possess the concept. I take the modifier ’unique’ 
to mean that one and only one concept is associated with the relevant 
possession conditions. Letting ’C’ with or without subscripts range over 
concepts, and ‘t’ range over thinkers, ’P(t,C)’ mean ’t possesses C’, and 
‘d(C,t)’ mean ‘ t  meets condition d(C)’, we have: 
(VC)(C = Concept F f-) (3!Cl)(U(Vt)(P ( t ,  C,) f-) d(C,,t)) & C = C,)) 
(where ’0’ represents the modal operator ’necessarily’ and ’ ( 3 ! x ) ’  means 
’there is one and only one 1’). Thus, we provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for any concept to be a particular concept in terms of a necessary 
and sufficient condition for a thinker to possess a concept. If the possession 
condition does not use or mention concept F ,  then this provides a reduction 
of the concept F in terms of the possession conditions. A thinker will 
possess the concept F iff there is one and only one concept C of the thinker 
for which he meets condition d(C).  Since the conditions that fix the 
identity of a concept are given in terms of a possession condition that 
specifies a role for a concept, this is, broadly speaking, a conceptual role 
account of concept individuation (for a fairly explicit statement of this, 
see pp. 107,112). The most important questions to be raised about this 
approach are whether it is plausible that there are any, or, at any rate, 
very many, true accounts of concept identity of the form above in which 
the possession conditions do not presuppose either the identity or the 
possession conditions of the very concept for which individuation con- 
ditions are being given. 
It will help to examine the case of the concept of conjunction, which 
Peacocke uses to illustrate the application of the form above. This will 
introduce some additional important features of Peacocke’s general 
approach. Conjunction is one of the most favorable cases for an account 
of a concept in terms of its conceptual role, since the sense of ‘and’ is 
exhausted by its truth table. A thinker possesses the concept of conjunction 
iff there is one and only one concept C of the thinker such that the thinker 
finds inferences of the form 
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to be Primitively compelling and does so because they are of these forms. The 
crucial notion here is that of finding an inference primitively compelling. 
According to Peacocke (p. 6 ) :  
To say that the thinker finds such transitions primitively compel- 
ling is to say this: (1) he finds them compelling; (2) he does not 
find them compelling because he has inferred them from other 
premises and/or principles; and (3) for possession of the concept 
C in question (here conjunction) he does not need to take the 
correctness of the transitions as answerable to anything else. 
Two points are worth noting about this explication of finding an inference 
primitively compelling. First, this is an explication primarily of the work 
that the adjective ’primitively’ i s  doing, and does not tell us what finding 
an inference compelling comes to. Second, the third condition introduces 
a normative requirement on finding something primitively compelling: I 
take the claim that finding an inference primitively compelling entails that 
one need not (not just does not) take its correctness to be answerable to 
anything else to mean that (i) the transition is correct, and (ii) it is correct 
in virtue of the form of the inference, since that is all that is in question 
here, and it is answerable to nothing else. 
The work that finding an inference or belief primitively compelling does 
is to fix those roles that a concept plays in a thinker’s mental economy 
that are constitutive of having the concept. It is in this light that the third 
condition above in particular should be understood, for that connects 
finding an inference primitively compelling with its being valid, and so 
with the truth grounds of the premises being sufficient for the truth 
grounds of the conclusion. This is connected with what inferences are 
constitutive of having the concepts involved in those inferences because 
the truth conditions of the content are determined by their constituent 
concepts and form. The notion of primitive compellingness later plays an 
important role in Peacocke’s discussion of how to reconcile his account 
of concepts with naturalism, and we will return below to some questions 
about finding something primitively compelling in the discussion of that 
project, and, in particular, to the question whether the current way of 
explaining it can be compatible with the use Peacocke wants to make of 
it there. 
The notion of finding something primitively compelling does not appear 
in all of the formulations of possession conditions that Peacocke gives in 
illustration, e.g. in specifying possession conditions for the concept red. 
Instead, the role of a concept is specified in terms of a speaker’s dispo- 
sitions in certain circumstances. For example, part of the possession con- 
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dition for the concept red would involve a specification of conditions under 
which the thinker would be disposed to have a belief whose form involved 
’a perceptual-demonstrative mode of presentation in predicational combi- 
nation with C’ (p. 7). 
Thus, the general strategy is to give individuation conditions for con- 
cepts in terms of (a) the forms of certain contents, and (b) conditions in 
which the thinker makes transitions between thoughts with contents of 
such forms, or conditions under which the thinker acquires thoughts with 
contents of such forms. 
The concepts that are constituents of a thought content should (as we 
have said) fix the truth conditions of the thought, the conditions under 
which the thought is true and the conditions under which it is false. This 
is implicit in the criterion for distinctness of concepts. The semantic value 
of the concept in the context of the thought is its contribution to the truth 
conditions of the thought. The possession conditions for a concept must 
therefore fix the semantic value of a concept relative to a context. Peacocke 
calls ‘a theory of how the semantic value of the concept is determined 
from its possession conditions (together with the world)’ a ’determination 
theory’. What is an example of a determination theory? In the case of 
conjunction (p. 18): 
the truth function that is the semantic value of conjunction is the 
function that makes transitions of the forms mentioned in the 
possession condition truth-preserving under all assignments to 
their constituents p and 9. 
This is a theory of how the semantic value is determined from the pos- 
session conditions in the sense that it gives a description of the semantic 
value in terms of a condition on the possession conditions: the semantic 
value of the concept of conjunction is whatever value is required in order 
to make the forms of inferences found primitively compelling by the 
possessor of the concept in virtue of having that concept valid inferences. 
The general form for such a description is (p. 19): 
The determination theory for a given concept (together with the 
world in empirical cases) assigns semantic values in such a way 
that the belief-forming practices mentioned in the concept’s pos- 
session condition are correct. 
The practices are correct if the beliefs formed are true, and inferences 
valid (p. 19). No doubt this is a bit too strong a requirement on correctness; 
a certain visual experience may be a rational basis upon which to form a 
certain belief, though it cannot guarantee its truth. One could put the 
requirement more cautiously and more generally by saying that correct 
determination theories make the relevant practices out to be epistemically 
virtuous, or rational. 
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In effect, this tells us what semantic value to assign to a concept given 
its possession conditions (and the world). It provides a test of whether a 
putative account of an antecedently given concept is an adequate one: if 
the semantic value assigned to the concept given the possession conditions 
in order to make the practices specified in the possession conditions out 
to be rational do not correspond with the semantic value of the concept 
in question, then the proposed possession conditions are incorrect. Thus, 
for any concept, given its semantic value, its possession conditions will 
be determined to be the set of practices involving contents with that 
concept that are required for the thinker who employs such contents to 
be rational. This has been a familiar theme in the philosophy of mind in 
the latter half of this century, though its presentation in Peacocke obscures 
a bit its relation to its antecedents. 
The worry raised earlier about the general form of Peacocke’s account 
of concept possession can now be reformulated. Concepts fix semantic 
values (given the world). Therefore, to maintain that the concepts a person 
possesses can be specified completely in terms of the roles they play in 
his mental economy, when those roles are specified in ways that do not 
presuppose he possesses any particular concepts, Peacocke must maintain 
that no more than one assignment of semantic values to concepts specified 
only in terms of their conceptual roles can make a thinker out to be 
rational. This seems to me to be extremely implausible, and Peacocke does 
not offer any argument to show that in all or even many cases this condition 
can be met. 
I said above that if the possession conditions for a given concept can 
be specified independently of using or mentioning the concept, one would 
have a reduction of that concept. Peacocke does not aim to give a reduction 
of concepts in this sense to possession conditions. This is clear from his 
remarks about acceptable possession conditions for the concept red (cf. 
pp. 8-9). Peacocke requires only that ’red‘ not be used in the scope of any 
attitude attributed to the thinker in specifying the possession conditions. 
Peacocke imposes this restriction so that the conditions given for pos- 
sessing a certain concept do not presuppose the possession of that very 
concept. For if ‘red‘ were used in the scope of an attitude attribution, that 
would presuppose that the thinker possessed the concept of red. However, 
‘red’ might be used to specify a certain property that the thinker must 
respond to in certain conditions in order to possess the concept. Such a 
use of ‘red’ in a specification of the possession conditions would not 
presuppose that the thinker possessed the concept. Peacocke, then, is 
concerned not with giving a reduction of concepts but rather of possession 
conditions for concepts. 
In addition to requiring that the possession conditions for a given 
concept, given its semantic value, be such as to make the thinker rational 
in his belief formation and transition practices involving contents of which 
the concept is a constituent, Peacocke says that ’[mleeting the possession 
condition for a concept can be identified with knowing what it is for 
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something to be the concept‘s semantic value (its reference)’ (p. 22). This 
is a reasonable requirement since meeting the possession conditions for 
a concept is possessing it, which we have already identified as grasping 
or understanding the concept, and since the role of the concept is to 
contribute systematically to the truth conditions for propositional contents, 
grasping or understanding the concept must surely involve knowing, in 
some sense, what its contribution to such truth conditions is, which will 
simply be its semantic value. It is less clear that a reductive account of 
possession conditions for concepts will succeed in preserving this epis- 
temic feature of concept possession. For this is tantamount to claiming 
that epistemic concepts can be reduced to non-epistemic concepts, certainly 
a thriving industry, but one, I believe, with at best dubious prospects. 
Let me mention briefly what I believe is a difficulty for Peacocke’s 
account that is raised by his view about the conditions under which it is 
correct to attribute propositional attitudes to thinkers. The difficulty is 
raised by Peacocke’s endorsement of Tyler Burge’s claim that our attitude 
contents are sensitive, given certain conditions, to conventions for word 
use in our linguistic community. Accepting this forces Peacocke to deny 
that someone who has a given attitude need possess the concepts which 
are constituents of its content. In general, possession conditions for con- 
cepts will appeal to attitudes of various forms of a thinker. If possessing 
concepts that are constituents of those attitudes is not a necessary condition 
for having them, as Peacocke admits, then there is no reason to object to 
mentioning the concept for which possession conditions are being speci- 
fied in the scope of an attitude, for this will not by itself presuppose the 
thinker possesses the concept. This also clearly raises a difficulty about 
the principle for distinctness of concepts, at least as I elaborated it. For 
that principle presupposes that everyone who entertains certain contents 
will immediately recognize them to be true. That presupposes that anyone 
who entertains the content will recognize that its truth conditions are 
trivially fulfilled. Since concepts function to contribute systematically to 
the truth conditions of contents, that presupposes in turn that the individ- 
ual grasps the concepts involved in the content, simply in virtue of enter- 
taining it. But that cannot be correct if someone can have or entertain a 
content without possessing all the concepts involved in it. I should 
emphasize, however, that this is a difficulty for Peacocke’s view only to 
the extent that he embraces Burge‘s view that one can have an attitude 
with a certain content without grasping the concepts involved in it. So 
far as I can see, nothing in Peacocke’s account depends on his endorsing 
Burge‘s view. 
A potentially more recalcitrant difficulty is raised by the question 
whether we can make sense of talk of finding inferences of certain forms 
primitively compelling without presupposing that a thinker actually pos- 
sesses concepts of the same or a more general sort. Talk of finding an 
inference compelling in virtue of its form certainly suggests that the thinker 
recognizes the inference to have a certain form. Take the inference from 
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A C B to B. What does it take to recognize this form of inference? Presum- 
ably, one has to recognize it as an inference from a judgment involving 
two contents as constituents linked by a ‘connective‘ of some sort. To so 
recognize it, one must therefore at least already possess certain concepts 
of the general categories of concepts one is explicating. This suggests that 
there can be no general reductive account of possession conditions for 
concepts in terms of finding inference forms primitively compelling 
because every such explanation presupposes a prior grasp of some con- 
cepts. Peacocke may deny that he intends ’finding an inference primitively 
compelling’ to require recognizing the form of the inference found to be 
primitively compelling, but then it becomes unclear what is meant by 
’finding an inference primitively compelling’. 
It will be worthwhile drawing out what is likely to be another conse- 
quence of Peacocke’s commitment to giving reductive conditions for pos- 
session conditions. It seems clear that many concepts cannot be specified 
by appeal simply to their conceptual role, if that is specified only in terms 
of inferential relations among attitudes, but must either be connected with 
various experiences or directly with the world. If this is right, then this 
commitment to giving reductive conditions for concept possession will 
inevitably involve appeal to relations to objects in our environments. Since 
on this view concepts are constituents of contents, this will commit us to 
an externalist theory of thought content, i.e. a theory according to which 
(some, at least) content properties are relational properties. This is not 
something that would worry Peacocke, since he is independently commit- 
ted to content properties being relational, but there remain serious diffi- 
culties for such theories, difficulties which the present approach to con- 
cepts, if it aims at giving reductive conditions for concept possession, will 
inherit . 
2. Systematicity and Productivity 
A virtue that Peacocke claims for his account of concepts is that it allows 
him to derive two important principles which are widely thought to be 
necessarily true of anything capable of thinking. These principles are that 
thought is systematic and productive. 
The systematicity of thought is the fact that a thinker capable of thinking 
a thought of a certain form, say, aRb, is able to think related thoughts of 
that form if he possesses concepts that play the same roles. For example, 
if u and b are singular concepts, and he possesses singular concepts c and 
d ,  which are in the same category as a and b, he is able to think bRa, cRb, 
dRb, cRd, etc. If he possesses a relational concept R’, which is of the same 
category as R, then he likewise can think aR’b, bR’c, etc. Peacocke calls 
this the ’Generality Constraint’ (p. 42): 
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Generality Constraint If a thinker can entertain the thought Fa 
and also possesses the singular mode of presentation b, which 
refers to something in the range of objects of which the concept 
F is true or false, then the thinker has the conceptual capacity for 
propositional attitudes containing the content Fb. 
Why does systematicity follow from Peacocke’s general account of con- 
cepts? The key is the requirement that possessing a concept is knowing 
what it is for something to be its semantic value, and the role of concepts 
as constituents of contents which together with the form of the content 
fix its truth conditions. To know what it is for something to be a predicative 
concept’s semantic value is to know what it is for some arbitrary object 
to fall under it, and this requires that, i f  one has the singular concept b, 
for example, one knows what it is for it to be the case that Fb, provided 
that b refers to an object in the range of objects to which F applies. 
Systematicity, on this view, is a result of the epistemic character of concept 
possession. 
Usually ’the productivity of thought’ is used to refer to that feature of 
thought whereby it is possible to think an indefinitely large number of 
novel thoughts. That is not the way that Peacocke uses the term. Peacocke‘s 
productivity principle is explained as follows (p. 46): 
Productivity Principle Suppose that a thinker possesses the first- 
level concept f and acquires a new singular concept m that denotes 
something in the significance range of F .  If in these circumstances 
the thinker continues to possess F, then he is in a position to 
know what it is for the thought Frn to be true without any further 
stipulations or determinations about the concept F .  
The explanation of this is the same as the explanation for the Generality 
Constraint. The Generality Constraint is explained by the fact that in 
possessing a concept F a thinker must know, for any arbitrary object in 
the appropriate range, what i t  is for that object to fall under F. Thus, if a 
thinker can think Fa, he possesses the concept F ,  and so knows what it 
is for an arbitrary object that falls in the range of objects that can be F to 
fall under it, and so can think for any singular concept c in the appropriate 
category Fc.  Thus, if he possesses the singular concept b, he can think Fb. 
And thus, likewise, if he acquires the singular concept m of the appropriate 
category, then he possesses it, and so can think Fm. Given that the expla- 
nation and the phenomenon in both the Generality Constraint and the 
Productivity Principle are basically the same, it is puzzling why Peacocke 
distinguishes them and treats them separately. 
It is important to note that the derivation of the Generality Constraint 
and the Productivity Principle relies only on the requirement that pos- 
sessing a concept is knowing what it is for something to be its semantic 
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value. That requirement, in turn, is derived from the view that concepts 
are constituents of contents, which together with their form determine 
their truth conditions, and that concepts can be individuated by their 
’information potential’. The argument will go through independently of 
the possibility of producing reductive possession conditions for concepts. 
A qualification must now be made to the above arguments. The attentive 
reader will recall that Peacocke denies that being able to think Fa requires 
possessing the concepts that are its constituents (because he endorses 
Burge’s view about the social determination of content). Thus, the Gener- 
ality Constraint and the Productivity Principle cannot be shown to be true 
by appeal to conditions on possessing concepts, since it is not a necessary 
condition on thinking Fa that one have the concept F ,  and it is not a 
necessary condition on acquiring a new singular concept m, that one 
possess it. Note that if one maintains that the Generality Constraint and 
the Productivity Principle are still held to be generally true, not just of 
thinkers who possess the concepts which their thoughts involve, Peacocke 
is not in a position to explain them. Peacocke intends (p. 41) that the 
Constraint and Principle apply only to thoughts of thinkers when they 
fully grasp the concepts involved in those thoughts. If one does hold a 
view like Burge’s, however, it is not clear that one would want to deny 
either the Generality Constraint or the Productivity Principle. Suppose, 
to take one of Burge’s examples, I believe that I have arthritis in my thigh, 
and so I believe that I have arthritis. Would it not be plausible to suppose 
that if I have or acquire a new singular concept m, that I would be in a 
position to think that m has arthritis? If that is true, surely the proper 
explanation will also serve as an explanation in the more restricted case 
of thinkers who possess the concepts that are constituents of their contents. 
3. Metaphysics 
Concepts are abstract objects. Peacocke’s account is committed to their 
existence since the Simple Account quantifies over them. But abstract 
objects do not stand in causal relations with other objects. How then can 
they play a role in characterizing ’the empirical mental states of thinkers’ 
They can play a role in characterizing the empirical mental states of 
thinkers provided that we can give an explanation of when it is appropriate 
to use a term referring to an abstract object to describe a mental state of 
a thinker that does not mention any concepts or contents. This can be 
done by specifying in general empirical conditions under which it is 
appropriate to describe a given state using an abstract object, and specify- 
ing that an individual fulfils those conditions. Thus, suppose, to use 
Peacocke’s example, that John believes that Lincoln Plaza is square. This 
is said (p. 106) to be equivalent to the conjunction of 
(p. 99)? 
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(I) John is in some state S that has the relational property R, 
and 
(2) The content that Lincoln Plaza is square is the unique content p 
such that necessarily for any state S, S is a belief that p iff S has 
the relational property R. 
Compare this with a parallel explanation of the use of numbers in num- 
bering physical objects. Suppose that there is one computer on my desk. 
This would be said to be equivalent to the conjunction of 
(3) (ax) (X is a computer on my desk and (Vy) (y is a computer on 
my desk + y = x)) 
and 
(4) One is the unique number R such that necessarily, for every 
property P, there are n things that are P iff (ax) (x has P and 
(Vy) (y has p-3 y = X I )  
Clearly, given (4), we have 
(5) There is one computer on my desk iff (ax) (x is a computer on 
my desk and (Vy) (y is a computer on my desk -+ y = x)) 
Likewise, given (2), we would have, 
(6) John believes that Lincoln Plaza is square iff John is in some 
state S that has the relational property R. 
If (2) and (4) are necessary truths, then so are (5)  and (6). In this case, we 
can systematically eliminate from our talk about beliefs (and other 
attitudes) any reference to abstract objects. (It is worth noting that as far 
as the form of the proposal goes, it is not necessary to require that 
the property the state has be a relational property.) Concepts contribute 
systematically to contents, and would be ultimately understood then in 
terms of their contribution to the relational property said to be necessary 
and sufficient for the possession of the content (in a given mode) by some 
thinker. This Panglossian prospect of course depends upon finding some 
relational property that is specifiable independently of any propositional 
attitudes, and which is necessarily equivalent to having a given prop- 
ositional attitude. 
What are the prospects for this? Clearly, it is no argument for there 
being such relational properties as are required that if there were, we 
would avoid this difficulty over using abstract objects to characterize belief 
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contents. Peacocke suggests ’that the relations required of a state if it is 
to be a belief with a given content are fixed by the possession conditions 
of the constituent concepts of the content’ (p. 107). Indeed, one feels that 
this should be stronger than a suggestion. Since the content is constituted 
by its constituent concepts and its form, Peacocke is virtually required to 
urge that his account of concepts will suffice, if there is some relational 
property a state can have that is necessary and sufficient for that state to 
be a belief with a certain content, in conjunction with the form of the 
content, to fix that relational property. This, of course, will be possible 
only if reductive possession conditions for concepts can be given. Peacocke 
gives here a succinct description of the sort of theory he has in mind 
(p. 107): 
A possession condition for a particular concept specifies a role 
that individuates that concept. The possession condition will men- 
tion the role of the concept in certain transitions that the thinker 
is willing to make. These will be transitions that involve complete 
propositional thoughts involving the concept. . . . Quite generally, 
each clause in the possession condition for a concept that occurs 
in a given complete propositional content makes a distinctive 
contribution to the requirements for a belief to have that prop- 
ositional content. The totality of requirements derived by consider- 
ing the contribution of each clause of a possession condition of 
each concept that occurs in the content fixes the relational property 
required for a belief to have that content. 
Peacocke offers a brief sketch of how this might go in the case of the 
belief that Lincoln Plaza is square. Each of the concepts Lincoln Plaza and 
square will have two clauses, one dealing with perceptual encounters 
with objects falling under the concepts, and one dealing with judgments 
involving the concepts in other circumstances. Call those for Lincoln Plaza 
L1 and L2, and for square S1 and S2. Then there are four cases to consider: 
L1 and S1, L2 and S2, L1 and S2, and L2 and S2. The clauses specify 
judgements the thinker is willing to make under certain conditions. To 
get the condition for the belief that Lincoln Plaza is square, we require 
that the speaker possesses the relevant concepts, and that for each pair of 
conditions specified in L1, L2, S1, S2, the thinker ’be willing in these 
circumstances to be in state S‘ iff he meet some appropriate condition. 
For example, in the case of the conditions specified in L 1  and S1, he must 
be willing to be in S ‘when he is taking his experience at face value, 
experiences some object as having both appearance Z [associated with 
being square] and appearance A [associated with Lincoln Plaza], and takes 
it for granted that the object is in the presupposed range’ (p. 111). Quite 
apart from worries about details of the formulations of possession con- 
ditions, one can get a lively sense of the difficulties facing this project by 
noticing that this part of the condition is shot through with what appear 
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to be attributions of intentional attitudes to the thinker. Until these are 
shown to be in principle eliminable, or we are given some reason to think 
they can be, it is clear that this sketch will not make plausible the claim 
that one can actually specify a property of the appropriate sort, that is, one 
that does not involve in its specification some reference to propositional 
attitudes, and so, on Peacocke’s view, some reference to abstract objects. 
4. Nonnativity 
Let us turn now to another challenge to Peacocke’s account, namely, 
that contents and concepts are nonnative and that normativity cannot be 
accommodated in a genuinely naturalistic world view. Contents are norma- 
tive in the sense that they are correct or incorrect, true or false. Concepts 
are normative in the sense that a particular kind of concept in a content 
may give reasons for accepting the content, perhaps relative to certain 
conditions, even independently of just its contribution to the truth con- 
ditions of the thought. For instance, my thought, I think, may give reason 
for its own truth in part in virtue of its having as a constituent the concept 
expressed by ‘1‘. In contrast, my thought, Ludwig thinks, does not give 
reason for its own truth, though it is necessarily equivalent to my thought, 
1 think. 
Why is normativity, of this sort, thought to be a problem for naturalism? 
And what is naturalism in the first place? The doctrine Peacocke has in 
mind places two constraints on a theory. First, ‘any explanation of an 
event or temporal state of affairs is a causal explanation’ (p. 127). Second, 
‘any truth is supervenient on purely descriptive truths’ (p. 127). Unfortu- 
nately, Peacocke does not give us his account of supervenience (this sort 
of lapse is characteristic of much of Peacocke’s discussion), and there are 
competing accounts in the philosophical literature on supervenience. Of 
particular importance is what modality Peacocke takes supervenience to 
involve. It is not clear to me what Peacocke has in mind here. However, 
to have something precise to work with, I will assume to begin with that 
Peacocke has in mind a doctrine of the following sort. I will raise below 
some questions about whether this is really what Peacocke has in mind. 
We can develop the account in two parts. A truth we will treat as a true 
proposition. Then we can say that 
a family of truths TI supervenes on a family of truths T, i f f  the 
family of propositions PI from which the truths of TI are drawn 
supervene on propositions in the family P, from which the truths 
of T, are drawn. 
Now we characterize what it is for one family of propositions to supervene 
on another. 
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Propositions in family P, supervene on propositions in family P2 
iff it is nomically necessary that for any proposition p, in family 
P,, if p, is true, then there is some proposition p2 of family P, 
such that p2 is true and it is nomically necessary that if p,, then 
P1. 
There are radical and moderate versions of the supervenience constraint, 
the difference between which is that the moderate version allows modal 
truths to figure in the descriptive truths, while the radical version does 
not. 
Peacocke’s remarks about the radical version of the supervenience con- 
straint suggest that he thinks that it is too strong a constraint. If we 
suppose, however, that he is concerned only with the moderate version 
of the supervenience constraint, we are faced with a puzzle. The require- 
ment that concepts be naturalizable turns out to be too easy to satisfy to 
see why there should be even prima facie a difficulty about them, or, at 
least, an a priori difficulty (and a philosophical theory would not be 
appropriately addressed to any other sort). For all that is required for 
normative truths to supervene on descriptive truths is that it be a (perhaps 
brute) nomic fact about the world that for every possible normative truth 
there be a possible descriptive truth that nomically requires it. The require- 
ment that every explanation of an event or temporal state of affairs be a 
causal explanation can then simply be stipulated to hold, and any form 
of explanation employing concepts which violates this can be rejected. 
Peacocke‘s subsequent discussion suggests, however, that he has a 
stronger constraint in mind, which may indicate that my characterization 
of supervenience above, particularly in the modality involved, is weaker 
than what Peacocke intends. The first sign of this occurs in the following 
passage (p. 135), in which Peacocke says, 
[I]t cannot always be the case that we characterize possession of 
a given concept . . . only by relating it to other conceptual capacit- 
ies of the thinker. If we were to do so, we would have no fully 
adequate answer to questions of the type, What is it for the thinker 
to possess concept C rather than concept D? It cannot always be 
satisfactory to answer his question only by saying that to possess 
C is to possess a concept that stands in certain relations to the 
thinker’s conceptual capacities involving the distinct concepts C, 
. . ., C,, while to possess D is correspondingly to possess a concept 
that stands in certain relations to his conceptual capacities involv- 
ing the distinct concepts D,, . . ., D,. For the same question can 
be raised in turn about possession of each of the Ci as contrasted 
with possession of the Di. At some point a good account of 
conceptual mastery must tie the mastery to abilities and relations 
that do not require conceptualization by the thinker. For any 
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concept not explicitly defined in terms of others, there must be a 
nonconceptual component in an account of mastery of it. 
It seems, then, that we make concepts naturalistically acceptable, on Peac- 
ocke’s account (in part), by ultimately reducing their possession conditions 
to facts that do not mention any particular concepts or possession con- 
ditions. What this comes to is illustrated by the example of the concept 
of conjunction above: in that case, we understand concept possession in 
terms of a thinker’s finding certain inference forms primitively compelling. 
How does this help? ’That a thinker finds certain transitions and principles 
primitively compelling and does so from certain causes is a naturalistically 
kosher claim’, Peacocke tells us (p. 138). So far so good, but we want also 
an account of the ’normative liaisons’ of concepts and the correctness 
conditions of contents. We get this from the requirement (discussed above) 
that we assign as semantic value to a concept whatever is required to 
make the inferences the thinker finds primitively compelling involving 
that concept out to be rational. This means that those inferences will ips0 
facto be correct inferences, and thinkers will have reason to regard them 
so simply in virtue of the concepts involved in them. Furthermore, of 
course, assigning a semantic value to the concepts ips0 facto provides 
judgments involving those concepts with correctness conditions. 
All this is more than is required to meet the conditions on naturalism 
as given above. This makes it look, then, as if Peacocke has in mind some 
more strenuous requirement, but it may be that he only wants to emphas- 
ize that his own account is sufficient to naturalize concepts, even if it is 
not necessary. 
At this point, we should return to the concept of finding something 
primitively compelling. It appears that part of Peacocke’s argument for his 
account being compatible with naturalism depends upon giving pos- 
session conditions in terms of primitive compellingness, and similar 
notions, and these being purely non-normative in character. (He says, that 
’a thinker finds certain transitions and principles primitively compelling 
. . .‘ is ‘not normative’ (p. 138).) It is not clear to me why this should be 
a requirement, but let us suppose for a moment that it is. In our first 
exposition of the concept of primitive compellingness, in order to sanction 
the claim that it was connected with possessing a certain concept, we 
built into it that an inference was primitively compelling only if in fact 
i t  was a valid or rational inference. If this is how we are to understand 
primitive compellingness, then clearly describing possession conditions 
in terms of primitive compellingness will not be non-normative. So we 
must suppose that at this point Peacocke does not want primitive compel- 
lingness to be understood in part in terms of the validity or rationality 
of the inferences found primitively compelling. This suggests he wants it 
for present purposes to be a purely psychological concept of some sort. 
This is certainly not a natural reading of it on its first introduction, but 
let us suppose it is simply a psychological concept which has no normative 
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implications. How then do we get from a description of possession con- 
ditions in terms of such a notion to such transitions being valid or-correct? 
The rough outline of such an explanation on Peacocke’s account would 
go as follows. X’s inference from P to Q is rational because (a) the inference 
from P to Q was of such and such a form, (b) inferences of such and 
such a form are found primitively compelling by X ,  (c) inferences found 
primitively compelling involve concepts whose semantic values make those 
inferences rational. The crucial claim in this of course is (c), and an 
important question to raise is why we should think (c) is true. Peacocke’s 
account, I take it, is that (c) is true because finding something primitively 
compelling is constitutive of what it is to possess a concept whose semantic 
value makes that inference rational. But here now is our puzzle: if the 
notion of finding something primitively compelling is not in fact norma- 
tively committed, if it is purely psychological, why should we think that 
(c) is true? What exactly is its status? It is hard to avoid the impression 
that Peacocke wants to have his cake and eat it too, something we can all 
sympathize with. 
Is Peacocke in the end successful in showing that his account is compat- 
ible with naturalism? This is a difficult question to answer. As I have 
indicated, on the most natural reading of his characterization of naturalism, 
one can do less than what Peacocke wants to do, and in fact there is 
simply no philosophical reason to deny that concepts and possession 
conditions are naturalizable. Much of Peacocke’s discussion, however, 
makes it look as if he has a higher standard in mind, but since it is unclear 
exactly what that standard is, it is difficult to tell whether he has met it. 
If the standard is that we give conceptually sufficient conditions for concept 
possession that are non-normative, then I think it is certainly very unclear 
that Peacocke has given us any reason to think that this can be done. 
5. The Concept of  Belief 
Peacocke’s account of the concept of belief is given in two clauses, one 
for first-person, and one for third-person contents. The full account is as 
follows (pp. 163-4): 
Possession Condition for the Concept of Belief 
cept R is the concept of belief only if 
(F) the thinker finds the first person content that he stands in R 
to p primitively compelling whenever he has the conscious belief 
that p [and the question of whether he does comes up] and he 
finds it compelling because he has that conscious belief; and 
A relational con- 
(T) in judging a thought of the third person form aRp, the thinker 
thereby incurs a commitment to a’s being in a state that has the 
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same content-dependent role in making a intelligible as the role 
of his own state of standing in R to p in making him intelligible, 
were he to be in that state. 
What makes the first condition plausibly a condition on a concept R 
being the concept of belief is a link that Peacocke introduces between 
I 
primitive compellingness and knowledge. Peacocke puts it this way 
(p. 157): 
Link between Possession Conditions and Knowledge Take any 
mental state of the thinker that a possession condition for a concept 
says is sufficient for the thinker finding primitively compelling a 
given content containing the concept. Then when a thinker judges 
that content and for the reason that he is in that state, his judge- 
ment constitutes knowledge. 
Putting this together with clause (F) above, we have the conclusion that 
a necessary condition on a concept R of a thinker being that of belief is 
that when he consciously believes that p and the question of whether he 
does comes up, he knows that he is R to p .  (Note that this requires that 
finding a content primitively compelling guarantees its truth, not just 
rationality.) This captures the intuitive requirement on having the concept 
of belief that one recognizes that one has the belief that p when one 
consciously does and the question comes up. (Peacocke rejects the view 
(to my mind correctly) that to consciously believe that p is to believe that 
one believes that p.) 
Let me raise briefly a question about clause (F) in Peacocke’s account. 
The question is about the status of the link between possession conditions 
and knowledge, which goes through the notion of primitive compel- 
lingness. We are faced here with a question similar to that we raised 
earlier about the notion of primitive compellingness. If we build into the 
notion of primitive compellingness an epistemic element, then the link 
between possession conditions and knowledge becomes a conceptual link. 
This seems to be in tension with the explanatory work that Peacocke 
sometimes wants to have the notion of finding something primitively 
compelling do. However, if the link is not secured in this way, then it is 
an important, and unanswered, question why there should be a link of 
this sort at all, and to the extent to which there being such a link is 
required to make plausible (F), this calls into question whether (F) is a 
necessary condition on having the concept of belief. For my part, I think 
Peacocke should make the connection conceptual, and not suppose that 
the notion of primitive compellingness can carry any or much explanatory 
weight. 
At this point, I can enter another argument on behalf of taking primitive 
compellingness to be conceptually bound up with knowledge. The account 
of concepts and concept possession that Peacocke gives in the book is 
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itself supposed to rest on an analysis of the concept of a concept (perhaps 
as the word is used in certain specialized contexts, but in which nonethe- 
less there is a fairly well worked out antecedent use). What is the epistem- 
ology of the account itself? A natural answer would be to say that the 
account is based on finding certain inferences and judgements involving 
the concept of a concept to be primitively compelling. But if finding 
something primitively compelling is not ips0 facto to recognize its truth 
or validity, then the account itself rests on air. So the very methodology 
of the project Peacocke engages in seems to commit him from the outset 
to treating primitive compellingness as an essentially epistemic state. This 
would not, 1 think, please those who seek a reduction of epistemic states 
or properties to non-epistemic ones, but I can see no reason why Peacocke 
cannot accept this. 
Let us turn now to the third-person clause in the characterization of 
the possession conditions for the concept of belief. A first difficulty for 
this is that there are some contents one attributes to others that one could 
not have oneself, most prominently, first-person thoughts attributed to 
others. If I say, 'He thinks he is hungry', I cannot suppose coherently that 
I could be in a state with that content, since only he could have a state 
with that content. This might be got round by introducing a subclause to 
deal with third-person attributions of first-person contents. The attributor 
would be required only to think a is in a state with the same content- 
dependent role as the role of a corresponding state of his own. Some work 
would have to be done in spelling out the idea of a corresponding state, 
but the intuitive idea is clear. A second complaint I have about this 
condition is that it is not very informative. In the first place, one could 
imagine the very same clause appearing in an explication of the concept 
of any contentful state, e.g. the concept of desire or intention. Of course, 
Peacocke does not represent himself as giving sufficient conditions for a 
concept to be the concept of belief, but this indicates something of the 
distance between this suggestion and an adequate account. In the second 
place, the general form of this explication of the concept of belief (or any 
other) seems unlikely to shed much light on the concept. Since we are 
believers, in attributing beliefs to others, we attribute to them states that 
we ourselves could have, or states analogs of which we could have, in the 
case of first-person or perspectival beliefs. So if we possess the concept, 
and think someone falls under it, of course we are committed to saying 
that he has a state that plays the same content-dependent role in making 
him intelligible as the role such a state would play in making us intelligible 
were we to have it. But this is no more informative than being told that 
if we possess the concept of weight, and think someone weighs 300 
kilograms, we are committed to saying that he is in a mass-dependent 
state which plays the same role in making him heavy as would the role 
of one's own mass-dependent state in making one heavy were one to be 
in that state. 
0 Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1994 
490 Mind 0 Language 
6. Conclusion 
Let me now summarize two main questions Peacocke‘s book leaves us 
with. 
First, the account is basically a conceptual role account. In the case of 
concepts like that of conjunction, it is not implausible that we could 
characterize the concept exhaustively in terms of its role in thought. It 
seems much less likely in the case of most other concepts, and Peacocke 
has not given us any reason to suppose that it is possible. In particular, 
in the case of empirical concepts, it looks as if the role of the concept will 
have to be spelled out in part in terms of an individual’s relations to his 
environment. I am myself extremely doubtful that any such relations are 
conceptually required to have belief contents about external objects. If this 
is right, then the kind of account being put forward here will not be 
successful. 
Second, the notion of primitive compellingness turns out to be central 
to much of the discussion of the book, but is inadequately characterized. 
On first introduction, it seems best understood in part in terms of the 
validity or rationality of the inferences found primitively compelling. How- 
ever, this seems to be something that is incompatible with some of the later 
explanatory work which Peacocke wants to use the notion for, especially in 
the discussion of naturalization. Exactly what is built into the concept of 
primitive compellingness needs to be clarified, and an explanation is 
needed of the connection between this notion and other crucial notions 
it is linked to in case the link turns out not be conceptual. 
I have not done justice to the wealth, subtlety, and intricacy of argument 
and allusion in Peacocke’s book. There are a great many comparisons of 
the view that Peacocke puts forward with the views of other prominenf 
philosophers, often interesting detailed criticisms of the views of others, 
and many more assumptions I would like to challenge than I have. A 
study of the book will, I think, pay dividends, even if one comes to it, 
and away from it, as I have, thinking that the project it articulates probably 
cannot be carried out. While clearly intended only as a propaedeutic to 
carrying out the project, A Study of Concepts brings together the elements 
of an impressive blueprint of a naturalistic account of concepts in terms 
of their possession conditions. No one, however, should pick up the book 
with the intention of reading it over the weekend. It is not an introductory 
work, and presupposes considerable knowledge of the field on the part 
of the reader. That, together with a formidable style, and a certain modesty 
about spelling out sometimes key notions, makes this a book that pays 
dividends only after a considerable investment of time. 
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